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__________________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
__________________ 
 
 
SCIRICA, Circuit Judge. 
 
 
 The central issue in this criminal appeal is whether  
8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2) makes a prior conviction for an aggravated 
felony an element of the offense, requiring proof for conviction, 
or whether it is a penalty enhancement provision under 8 U.S.C.  
§ 1326(a), which sets forth the elements of the offense. 
I. 
 On May 14, 1990, Jesus Rhadames DeLeon-Rodriguez, a 
citizen of the Dominican Republic, was convicted of delivery of 
cocaine in the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County, 
Pennsylvania and sentenced to eighteen to sixty months 
imprisonment.  As a result of his conviction he was deported to 
the Dominican Republic on May 17, 1991. 
 On July 28, 1994 Rodriguez was again arrested in Berks 
County on drug related charges.  After notification by the local 
police, the Immigration and Naturalization Service interviewed 
Rodriguez about his immigration status.  During the interview 
Rodriguez admitted he had been deported in 1991 and that he had 
illegally reentered the United States in 1993 by boat at  
San Juan, Puerto Rico.  After receiving Miranda warnings, 
Rodriguez invoked his right to counsel and no further questions 
were asked. 
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 Rodriguez was charged by the government with illegal 
reentry after deportation in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2) 
(1994), which provides: 
Notwithstanding subsection (a) of this 
section, in the case of any alien described 
in such subsection . . .  
  (2) whose deportation was subsequent to a 
conviction for commission of an aggravated 
felony, such alien shall be fined under such 
Title, imprisoned not more than 20 years, or 
both.1 
  
                     
11.  8 U.S.C. § 1326 (1994) provides:  
 
    (a) Subject to subsection (b) of this section, any alien          
who- 
  (1) has been arrested and deported or 
excluded and deported, and thereafter  
  (2) enters, attempts to enter, or is at any 
time found in, the United States, unless (A) 
prior to his reembarkation at a place outside 
the United States or his application for 
admission from foreign contiguous territory, 
the Attorney General has expressly consented 
to such alien's reapplying for admission; or 
(B) with respect to an alien previously 
excluded and deported, unless such alien 
shall establish that he was not required to 
obtain such advance consent under this 
chapter of any prior Act,  
      shall be fined under Title 18, or imprisoned not more than 
      2 years, or both. 
    (b)  Notwithstanding subsection (a) of this section, in 
    the case of any alien described in such subsection -- 
  (l)  whose deportation was subsequent to a 
conviction for commission of three or more 
misdemeanors involving drugs, crimes against 
the person, or both, or a felony (other than 
an aggravated felony), such alien shall be 
fined under Title l8, imprisoned not more 
than l0 years, or both; or  
  (2)  whose deportation was subsequent to a 
conviction for commission of an aggravated 
felony, such alien shall be fined under such 
Title, imprisoned not more than 20 years, or 
both. 
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Rodriguez was convicted at a bench trial and sentenced to 
seventy-two months imprisonment.2  This appeal followed.  We have 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, as well as 18 U.S.C. 
3742(a).  United States v. Shoupe, 988 F.2d 440 (3d Cir. 1993).   
II. 
 The principal question raised in this appeal is whether 
a prior conviction for an aggravated felony is an element of  
8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2) or simply a condition triggering an 
enhanced penalty.  At trial, Rodriguez sought dismissal of his 
indictment for failure to state an offense, because it omitted 
what he claims is an essential element of the offense --
deportation subsequent to a conviction for an aggravated felony. 
The district court held this was not an element of the offense 
and denied the motion.3  We exercise plenary review. 
 Several other circuits have already addressed this 
issue.4  Of those, all but one has held that § 1326(b)(2) is a 
                     
22.  At sentencing, the district court determined that Rodriguez 
had been deported after commission of an aggravated felony. 
33.  The district court also determined that Rodriguez's motion 
to dismiss the indictment based on this alleged defect was 
untimely. On appeal, the government did not argue timeliness or 
waiver. Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(f) vests a district court with 
general power to determine that a party has waived a right to 
object or raise a defense after having failed to advance it in a 
timely manner. Yet Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b)(2) delineates two 
objections, or defenses, which "shall be noticed by the court at 
any time during the pendency of the proceedings"--a failure to 
show jurisdiction in the court and a failure to charge an 
offense.  See United States v. Cury, 313 F.2d 337, 343 (3d Cir. 
1963).   In view of this, we believe the motion was timely. 
 
44.  In United States v. Eversley, 55 F.3d 870 (3d Cir. 1995), we 
explained "we need not address the question ... whether 
§1326(b)(1) and (2) constitute sentence enhancement provisions 
rather than offenses distinct from § 1326(a)."  Id. at 871 n.3.   
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sentencing enhancement provision.  See United States v. Palacios-
Casquete, 55 F.3d 557, 559 (11th Cir. 1995), petition for cert. 
filed (Sept. 5, 1995) (No. 95-5849); United States v. Munoz-
Cerna, 47 F.3d 207, 210 n.6 (7th Cir. 1995) ("the better view is 
that the subsections [of § 1326] are sentence enhancements); 
United States v. Cole, 32 F.3d 16, 18 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 
115 S. Ct. 497 (1994); United States v. Crawford, 18 F.3d 1173, 
1177 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 171 (1994); United 
States v. Forbes, 16 F.3d 1294, 1297-30 (1st Cir. 1994); United 
States v. Vasquez-Olvera, 999 F.2d 943, 945 (5th Cir. 1993), 
cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 889 (1994); but see United States v. 
Campos-Martinez, 976 F.2d 589 (9th Cir. 1992).  Upon examining 
the language and structure of § 1326(b), we too are convinced it 
is a sentencing enhancement provision rather than an offense 
distinct from § 1326(a). 
 Section 1326(a) sets out the elements of the offense 
(arrest, deportation, and re-entry) and certain penalties (fine 
and two-year maximum imprisonment), while subsection (b)(2) sets 
forth no elements but only provides for stiffer penalties based 
on criminal history (after conviction of an aggravated felony). 
Section 1326(b) itself sets forth no elements of an offense.5 The 
language and structure make clear that § 1326 is a sentencing 
enhancement provision only. 
 The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit shares our 
view that the structure of § 1326 as a whole demonstrates that 
                     
55.  Section 1326(b) is set out in full in footnote 1. 
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§1326(b) is an enhancement provision.  United States v. Cole, 32 
F.3d at 18.  The Courts of Appeals for the Fourth and Fifth 
Circuits reached the same conclusion under a "plain language" 
analysis of § 1326.  Crawford, 18 F.3d at 1177; Vasquez-Olvera, 
999 F.2d at 945.  
 In addition, the title assigned to § 1326 supports the 
view that it outlines a single offense with varying penalties. 
Before the 1988 amendments, the section was entitled "Reentry of 
deported alien;" after the amendments, it reads ""Reentry of 
deported alien; criminal penalties for reentry of certain 
deported aliens."  8 U.S.C. § 1326.  As the Fourth Circuit 
explained, "[t]his change in title indicates that, by amending 
§1326, Congress intended to create enhanced penalties for 
'certain' aliens who commit the underlying offense of unlawfully 
reentering the United States after having been previously 
deported, not to create a separate substantive offense." 
Crawford, 18 F.3d at 1177; see also Vasquez-Olvera, 999 F.2d at 
945; Palacios-Casquete, 55 F.3d at 560 (looking to "evolution of 
§ 1326 through its various amendments" to conclude it defines one 
substantive crime).   
 The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit also 
construes § 1326(b) as an enhancement provision, but relies 
principally on a public policy argument.  Referring to 
evidentiary rules and decisional law, the court found strong 
policy reasons to exclude or limit information about prior 
convictions at trial, citing the possibility of undue prejudice. 
Interpreting § 1326(b) to require proof at trial of conviction of 
8 
a prior offense would contravene this principle.  In the absence 
of explicit congressional direction, the court explained it was 
"reluctant to impose that burden on defendants."  Forbes, 16 F.3d 
at 1300. 
 Only the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has 
reached the conclusion that § 1326(b)(2) is not an enhancement 
provision.  The first appellate court to consider the question, 
it found the different subsections of 8 U.S.C. § 1326 delineate 
separate offenses, the elements of which must be proven at trial, 
not just at sentencing.  See, e.g., United States v. Arias-
Granados, 941 F.2d 996 (9th Cir. 1991); United States v. 
Gonzales-Medina, 976 F.2d 570 (9th Cir. 1992); United States v. 
Campos-Martinez, 976 F.2d 589 (9th Cir. 1992).  While two earlier 
Ninth Circuit panels reached this conclusion without explanation, 
in United States v. Campos-Martinez, the Ninth Circuit set forth 
the reasons for its holding.  Although citing the precedent of 
Arias-Granados, the court relied on its interpretation of 8 
U.S.C. § 1325 as a guide in interpreting § 1326.6  Section 
                     
66.  8 U.S.C. § 1325(a) (1994) provides: 
 
Any alien who (1) enters or attempts to enter 
the United States at any time or place other 
than as designated by immigration officers, 
or (2) eludes examination or inspection by 
immigration officers, or (3) attempts to 
enter or obtains entry to the United States 
by a willfully false or misleading 
representation or the willful concealment of 
a material fact, shall, for the first 
commission of any such offense, be fined 
under Title 18 or imprisoned not more than 6 
months, or both, and, for a subsequent 
commission of any such offense, be fined 
9 
1325(a) makes illegal entry a crime with a maximum sentence of 
six months imprisonment.  The same section provides that illegal 
entry after a previous conviction for illegal entry is a separate 
crime with a maximum two year sentence.  Campos-Martinez, 976 
F.2d at 591.  The court found that because "[s]ections 1325 and 
1326 are similar in structure, operation, purpose, and subject 
matter . . . section 1325 provides the best analogy" available in 
interpreting § 1326, and therefore § 1326 ought to be understood 
as delineating distinct offenses.  Id. at 592.    
 We are not convinced.  Instead, like the Second, Fourth 
and Fifth Circuits, we believe the language and structure of  
§ 1326 establish that § 1326(b)(2) is a sentencing enhancement 
provision rather than an offense distinct from § 1326(a).  We 
will affirm the district court's denial of Rodriguez's motion to 
dismiss the indictment on the grounds it failed to state an 
offense. 
III. 
 Rodriguez contends the district court should have 
granted him a reduction in his offense level for having "accepted 
responsibility," under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1.(a)(1994), which permits 
a reduction "[i]f the defendant clearly demonstrates acceptance 
of responsibility for his offense." 
 Whether a defendant has "accepted responsibility" is a 
factual matter and is reviewed under a "clearly erroneous" 
standard.  See United States v. Rodriguez, 975 F.2d 999, 1008  
                                                                  
under Title 18, or imprisoned not more than 2 
years, or both. 
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(3d Cir. 1992).  "The sentencing judge is in a unique position to 
evaluate a defendant's acceptance of responsibility.  For this 
reason, the determination of the sentencing judge is entitled to 
great deference on review."  Application Note 5 to U.S.S.G.  
§ 3E1.1. 
 A defendant bears the burden of establishing by a 
preponderance of the evidence that a reduction under this 
provision is warranted.  Rodriguez, 975 F.2d at 1008.  Rodriguez 
advanced several factors to support his request for an offense 
level reduction.  Looking to his pretrial conduct, Rodriguez 
characterizes his interview with the INS agent as a "confession." 
Brief for Appellant at 4.  As for his subsequent conduct, he 
contends that at trial he "did not contest any of the factual 
allegations of the government . . . did not deny or even move to 
suppress [his] confession, and . . . did not present any 
evidence."  Brief for Appellant at 5.  Moreover, Rodriguez 
characterizes his objections during trial as "purely legal ones," 
and points to his limited cross-examination of the government's 
witnesses.  Also, near the end of the trial, Rodriguez sought to 
enter a Zudick guilty plea, conditioned on a determination of a 
preserved appellate issue.  United States v. Zudick, 523 F.2d 
848, 851 (3d Cir. 1975).  Overall, Rodriguez contends he 
effectively left unchallenged the government's case against him 
and contested only selected legal issues but not the central fact 
of the case -- that he had illegally reentered the United States 
after deportation.  
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   The district court disagreed.  It found that 
Rodriguez's brief initial statements during the interview with 
the INS agent did not manifest an acceptance of responsibility. 
Furthermore, the court found the government was "put to the test 
in its offering of evidence."  Among other challenges, Rodriguez 
contested the testimony of the police officer who found him in 
the United States subsequent to deportation; questioned the 
relevance of the government's evidence on INS deportation 
procedures and the credibility of evidence in the INS file; 
cross-examined the government's witness about his personal 
knowledge of Rodriguez's deportation; attacked the quality and 
accuracy of the government's fingerprint evidence; and sought to 
exclude INS exhibits and documentary evidence which went to an 
essential element of the offense and to the heart of the 
prosecution's case.   
 After examining the record we find no error. 
Application Note 2 to § 3E1.1 explains that a reduction is 
generally not meant to apply to a defendant who puts the 
government to its burden of proof at trial.  While the 
Application Note adds that "[c]onviction by trial . . . does not 
automatically preclude a defendant from consideration for such a 
reduction," it suggests that a reduction should be granted only 
in "rare situations," such as when a "defendant goes to trial to 
assert and preserve issues that do not relate to factual guilt 
(e.g., to make a constitutional challenge to a statute or a 
challenge to the applicability of a statute to his conduct)." The 
district court found that Rodriguez "contested his factual guilt 
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. . . beyond a mere legal challenge."  Appendix at 136a. We 
agree.   
IV. 
 We will affirm the judgment of conviction and sentence. 
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